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Egypt's Socialism and Marxist Thought: 
Some Preliminary Observations on 
Social Theory and Metaphysics 
SHAHROUGH AKHAVI 
University of South Carolina 
I. THE PRIOR SIGNIFICANCE OF UNITY 
Since 1952 the elaboration of Egyptian ideology has constituted a source 
of conflict between the regime and the left/right opposition. In trying to 
capture the ideological center, the regime has inevitably drawn itself into 
the maelstrom of public contention characterized by mass conformity, 
intimidation, purges, arrests, show trials and incarceration of all who 
fundamentally question the principles of the leadership. Democratic 
cooperative socialism ('Arab socialism') is the official ideology, and a spate 
of books and articles have been published on its significance for Egyptian 
politics. Despite all these efforts, confusion still tends to reign over this 
concept, both among Egyptians themselves, and outsiders studying it. 
It is essential to build toward a definition of Arab socialism in its 
Egyptian variant. It seems to mean, among other things, and first of all, 
unity of all Arabs: the establishment of unity both inside and outside the 
country in the struggle for the abolition of expoitation of the Arab 
(working) masses. The parentheses around the term, working, indicates 
the occasional and even casual attitude of the regime to the social basis of 
its revolution. More often than not, Egyptian spokesmen invoke the masses 
as a whole, thereby demonstrating symbolically their preference for unity 
over equality 
Without question, the more prior of the twin concepts of unity and 
egalitarianism (i.e. the abolition of exploitation), both of which are 
embedded at the core of the Egyptian interpretation of Arab socialism, is 
unity. It is the mutual identification of Arabs in terms of race, ethnicity, 
religion, language, region, as well as common sense of purpose, shared 
commitment to a particular social and political community above and 
beyond all lesser commitments, a willingness to continue to coexist in the 
framework of this commitment, and solidarity in the quest for their 
greater destiny which, to Egyptians, make possible the attainment of 
egalitarianism. 
I9o 
EGYPT'S SOCIALISM AND MARXIST THOUGHT I9I 
By contrast, the abolition of man's exploitation of his fellow man, the 
levelling of social stratification, the ending of social alienation-these are 
seen to be epiphenomena, deriving logically as effects from Arab national 
unity and identity. The argument of Egyptian theoreticians carries the 
strong implication (and occasionally forthright assertion) that equality is 
a dependent variable. 
It might appear that to anatomize Egypt's version of Arab socialism in 
this manner does violence to a body of thought and action which Arabs 
intend to be viewed as a whole. However, it will be seen that Arab social- 
ism's Egyptian advocates follow precisely this method in their attempt to 
respond to their critics. Arab socialism, to Egyptian spokesmen, is ad- 
mittedly an ideology whose basis and 'point of departure' [muntaliq] is 
nationalism.1 The argument concerning Arab socialism insists that an 
Arab nation2 exists, and this existence serves as the fundamental reference 
point for everything that follows. Once unity is established, anchored in 
the bedrock of nationality everything necessary for the construction of 
socialism will come to hand. This is not to deny, the argument runs, that 
the construction of socialism in the Arab nation will be a difficult task. 
But it is to say that without devotion to the variables associated with 
nationality and nationalism, it is hopeless for Arabs to think of building 
socialism in the first place. Indeed, no revolution can be progressive in the 
Arab world if Arabs are divided artificially into the territorial entities that 
currently demarcate nation-states from one another. Such, at least, is the 
reasoning of Egyptians advocating Arab socialism. Says one leading 
interpreter: 
This means that there [must] be one Arab socialist revolution, not a number of socialist 
experiences or revolutions. The difference is clear: the Arab socialist revolution realizes 
Arab unity and socialism together, [whereas] a number of revolutions [in different Arab 
states] achieve what they can while division and separation continue. In other words, 
ultimately, as far as the indivisibility of the Arab destiny is concerned, they [i.e., several 
Arab revolutions] are not progressive and will find themselves willy nilly standing on 
the very same foundations made firm by capitalist imperialism.3 
1 'Ismat Sayf al-Dawlah, Al-Tariq ila al-Ishtirakiyyah [The Path to Socialism] (Cairo: Dar 
al-Nahdah al-'Arabiyyah, 1968), pp. 5-8. In a revealing passage the author writes: 'The point 
of departure of nationality for [Arab] socialism means that the objective of the Arab socialist 
revolution is the liberation of all the Arab masses from exploitation', i.e. nationality effects 
equality. Cf. the traditional Marxist position that the point of departure for all analysis is 
contradiction-i.e. contradiction effects equality. 
2 The term 'Arab nation' [al-watan al-'arabi] signifies a unitary political and social system 
for all Arabs from the Atlantic to the Gulf. The notion of its existence in reality illustrates the 
fallacy of reification or misplaced concreteness. As a concept, Arab nation carries a potent 
appeal. But the transformation of concept into praxis is a task that still waits to be done. 
3 Sayf al-Dawlah, p. 8. Emphasis supplied. Division is abhorrent, in short, because it is 
that upon which capitalism thrives. Unity, on the other hand, is laudable because it comprises 
the nourishment for socialist construction. Sayf al-Dawlah is of course echoing exactly the 
sentiments of Michel 'Aflaq, co-founder of the Ba'th Party (a source of profound inspiration 
for Egypt's socialism), when he wrote that 'any viewpoint or remedy of the vital difficulties 
of the Arabs, either in part or in toto, which does not emanate from the axiom "The Unity 
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Rather than proceeding by close argument to demonstrate the actual 
existence and necessity of Arab unity, passages such as these assert that 
ethnicity, religious and linguistic identity and the like determine the success- 
ful or unsuccessful construction of socialism. This may be contrasted to 
the focus on the mode of production as the starting point for an analytical 
examination of the building of socialism in any society. Without question- 
ing the tremendous impact of nationality-based factors in explaining 
political dynamics in human societies, one cannot help but be struck at 
the disregard for that which European socialists have traditionally con- 
sidered the heart of the entire matter: examination of social systems on the 
basis of their organization of productive relations and the growth of 
productive forces, the social division of labor, and the separation of large 
segments of society into mutually hostile classes. Here, then, is a major 
distinction between the perspective of European and Egyptian socialists.4 
Why is it that there must be a single Arab socialist revolution and not 
a series of socialist transformations in individual nation-states ? What, after 
all, does nationality have to do with this essentially secular process ? The 
answer that is normally given is along the following lines: the Arab masses 
demand a single, united effort; their Arabness is an emanation of their true 
feelings and the heritage of the past. However, Arab socialists have never 
successfully answered the challenge thrown out at them by the then First 
Party Secretary of the CPSU, Nikita Khrushchev, during the official 
ceremonies marking the completion of the construction of the first stage 
of the High Dam at Aswan in May 1964: what would the future of the 
Bolshevik Revolution have been had Lenin said to the Great Russians, 
'unite against everyone; you are the best of people, the salt of the earth' ? 
Khrushchev demanded of his startled Egyptian hosts how socialism based 
on nationality could be possible if its acceptance in the Russian case would 
have meant relegating the Ukrainians, White Russians, Uzbeks, and so 
on to a permanent inferiority. He upbraided the Egyptian and other 
Arab speakers at the ceremony (Ben Bella, Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam 
'Arif) for constant references in their speeches to Arab unity. But where 
do the Soviets fit in? Khrushchev demanded. Must they be excluded? 
Lenin called for unity on a class basis, and Arab capitalists and feudalists 
are not the brethren of the Arab proletariat. 'It is easier to eat bags of 
salt' than to unite with the non-working elements of the Arab world.5 
of the Arab People" is an erroneous outlook and an injurious cure'. 'Aflaq, Ma'rakah al- 
Masir al-Wahid (Beirut, 1953), p. 19, cited in Gordon H. Torrey, 'The Ba'th-Ideology and 
Practice,' The Middle East Journal, Vol. 23, 4 (Autumn 1969), p. 448. 
4 For an excellent discussion of the reaction in the Arab world to the Marxist explanation 
of historical development as a function of class struggle and the Arab preference for explaining 
this development in terms of 'the external confrontation of nationalitarian groups', see 
Maxime Rodinson, 'Dynamique interne ou dynamique globale: l'exemple des pays musul- 
mans', Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie, XLII (Jan.-June 1967), pp. 27-47. 5 For these remarks, published by the Egyptians (albeit inconspicuously, on the obituary 
page), see al-Ahram, May 17, 1964. 
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Khrushchev seemed to be implying that the stress on ethnic unity might be 
less relevant for the construction of socialism than as a framework for 
the demogogic manipulation of political action in general. According 
to the reasoning behind this implication, therefore, the importance of unity 
resides in the role unification plays in the power-political aspirations of 
certain elites.6 
Thus far, it has been argued that Egypt's socialist theoreticians consider 
nationalism, nationality and national consciousness as the ne plus ultra 
of their system. The break with Marxism and neo-Marxism could not be 
clearer. Lenin, for example, in one of his earliest tracts, ridiculed the notion 
of a 'Russian' road to socialism that could bypass capitalism.7 Marx did, 
at one point, raise the possibility that the Russian commune might serve 
as the mechanism by which Russian society might move into a post- 
capitalist stage. But this was an isolated instance and surely does not 
represent Marx's thinking in its total frame and system.8 
It is true that the Marxist-Leninists have since gone through a number of 
stages in their thinking on the role of nationalism or nationality in the 
building of socialism.9 But even the Yugoslavs, whose revisionism largely 
brought about Khrushchev's ideological innovation of 'separate paths to 
socialism' in 1955 and 1956 consider the national phenomenon as a less 
than decisive factor. To the Yugoslavs the doctrine of separate paths, far 
from glorifying the 'Yugoslav Idea' or nation, is an instrument to maintain 
distance from Soviet intervention in their country. Egyptians, on the other 
hand, tend to view nation, nationality and nationalism as ends in them- 
selves. While the Romanians, to take another example from Eastern 
Europe, demand autonomy from the Bolshevik-Soviet model, they place 
the emphasis not upon ethnicity but upon ecological peculiarities that 
make it difficult for them to follow that model. Similarly, when the term 
'national communism' came into use in connection with events in Poland 
and Hungary in the mid-fifties, observers seemed to agree that the concept 
signified the absence of certain structural characteristics in these societies, 
6 Here, Arab unity becomes, like religion for Marx, the opiate of the masses, as it were. 
7 See Lenin's What the 'Friends of the People' Are and How They Fight Social Democracy 
(1894) in his Works, numerous editions. Although later in his life (say 1915), he felt Russia to 
be ripe for revolution because of its backwardness-in itself a paradox-he did not feel that 
a Russian revolution by itself could survive. Cf. his article, 'On the United States of Europe 
Slogan', August 23, 1915, in Selected Works (London: 1947), Vol. 1, pp. 630 ff. 
8 Marx and Engels, joint preface to the second Russian edition of the Communist Manifesto, 
1882: 'if the Russian Revolution becomes the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West 
so that both complement each other, the present Russian common ownership of land may 
serve as the starting point for communist development'. Cited in George Lichtheim, Marxism: 
An Historical and Critical Study (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 327-8. 9 See, for example, V. L. Tiagunenko, 'Sotsialisticheskie Doktriny Obshchestvennogo 
Razvitiia Osvobodivshikhsa Stran' [Socialist Doctrines of Social Development in the Liber- 
ated Countries], Mirovaia Ekonomika i Muzhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, No. 8 (Aug. 1965), pp. 
79-86; G. Mirskii and T. Pokataeva, 'Klassy i Klassovaia Borba v Razvivaiushchikhsa 
Stranax' [Classes and the Class Struggle in the Developing Countries], ibid., nos. 2 and 3 
(February and March 1966), pp. 38-50; 57-70 respectively. 
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which absence militated against a Stalinist model of socialist construction. 
But the Egyptian socialists adopt another view toward 'separate paths' 
To them, nationalism and unity lie at the heart of what makes the socialist 
engine run. They are not the lubrication that contains and smoothens the 
process but rather the power source itself. This is the difference, between 
nation variables as the energy supply as opposed to nation variables as 
comprising the engine block within which this energy is given off. Thus, 
if one may carry this metaphor to the end, European socialist advocates 
of separate paths seem to mean that the suspension in which the whole 
system rests must be less viscous than that in which the Soviet model has 
been suspended. Egyptian socialist advocates of separate paths, however, 
feel that the system itself cannot run on the basis of cleavages in society 
that must work themselves out through mutual collision and struggle. 
The power source must be replaced. In the end, European socialists tend 
to view their differences with the Soviets as differences in degree: the 
common denominator is still dialectics and contradiction as the motor of 
history. The Egyptians view their differences with all other socialists as 
differences in kind, stressing the indivisibility of the Arab people as the 
engine. 
For the Egyptian socialists, socialism consists of liberation of all Arabs 
from exploitation. Their writers have addressed less attention to the de- 
finition of exploitation and the social basis of politics. In the need to 
condemn colonialism and neo-colonialism, the Egyptian theorists tend to 
merge practically all rank-and-file Arabs into the 'exploited' ranks. It is 
true that 'feudalists' and 'comprador bourgeoisie' are excluded from the 
Arab populations to be embraced by Arab unity and nationalism. But it is 
not made clear how one can harmonize and reconcile the different interests 
of the petite bourgeoisie, the 'military' bourgeoisie (a Soviet innovation 
after 1967), and Bottomore's 'new middle classes'.10 To what extent the 
typical Egyptian Arab is an excellent source for socialist cadres in Egypt 
is a question that badly needs asking by the establishment theoreticians. 
Some of the more perceptive of these, such as former cabinet figure, 
10 Tom B. Bottomore, Classes in Modern Society (New York: Pantheon Books, 1966), pp. 
23 ff. As examples, he cites 'office workers, supervisers, managers, technicians, scientists, and 
many of those who are employed in providing services of one kind or another...'. For a 
discussion of the utility of the concept of 'new middle class' (originally proposed by Manfred 
Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa [Princeton: Prince- 
ton University Press, 19631), see Amos Perlmutter, 'Egypt and the Myth of the New Middle 
Class', Comparative Studies in Society and History, IX, 4 (October 1967); Manfred Halpern, 
'Egypt and the New Middle Class: Reaffirmations and New Explorations', CSSH, XI, 1 
(January 1969); Perlmutter, 'The Myth of the Myth of the New Middle Class: Some Lessons 
in Social and Political Theory', CSSH, XII, 1 (January 1970); Halpern, 'The Problem of 
Becoming Conscious of a Salaried New Middle Class', ibid. For another approach, utilizing 
the concept of neo-patrimonialism and rejecting the concept of class as inapplicable in 
Egypt's case, see Shahrough Akhavi, 'The Egyptian Political Elite', in Comparative Political 
Elites in the Middle East: Seven Cases, ed. Frank Tachau (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman. 
1975), pp. 70-117. 
EGYPT'S SOCIALISM AND MARXIST THOUGHT 195 
Kamal al-Din Mahmud Rif'at, have been uneasy about the regime version 
of socialism (which they themselves have helped elaborate!). But few 
analysts have inquired more systematically into the social composition 
of the Egyptian masses to analyze which sectors are revolutionary and 
which are apathetic or counter-revolutionary. There is a need for further 
efforts in Egyptian sociology to differentiate among: 
(1) the military (and within it, various sub-units or groups); 
(2) the 'national bourgeoisie' and 'national capitalists'; 
(3) the 'petite bourgeoisie'; 
(4) the middle rural sectors; 
(5) the revolutionary intelligentsia; 
(6) the urban professionals; 
(7) the administrative stratum or forces; 
(8) the industrial proletariat; 
(9) the small and poor peasantry; 
(10) agricultural laborers; 
(11) the lumpenproletariat; 
(12) tribal or nomadic groups.1l 
To the contrary, the analyses of Egypt's interpreters of Arab socialism 
seem to perpetuate the classic and medieval Islamic mode of both in- 
tuitional and a priori12 thought; this has hampered serious Egyptian 
scholarly work in social science inquiry. The dearth of a posteriori reasoning 
and sociological method may, at worst, lead to the substitution of assertion 
and polemic for fact and logic. To borrow an image from geometry, this 
resembles the use of the very theorem one is trying to prove in the form of a 
hypothesis somewhere in the proof itself. In this case, the theorem is that 
the achievement of Arab unity will result in socialism. In the process of 
proving this, a short cut is taken, and it is assumed that by and large the 
Arab people have common interests due to their exploitation by internal 
overlords and external imperialists; they yearn to expunge this exploitation; 
they feel that unity will make this possible . . . and suddenly it is asserted 
that hence [sic!], once they attain their unity, no more exploitation will 
exist, socialism will be achieved (quod erat demonstrandum!). This pro- 
1 The Egyptian socialists facilely place these categories into the 'alliance of the popular 
working forces'-a formula indicating a broad coalition of 'progressive' elements in the society. 
Excluded from the alliance are members of the former royal house, landed magnates, com- 
prador and grand bourgeoisie. 
12 'A priori points to notions, propositions, or postulates that are considered true or neces- 
sary irrespective of experience or anterior to it; in other words, not derived from experience 
and yet considered valid'. Arnold Brecht, Political Theory: The Foundations of Twentieth 
Century Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 99. Good socio- 
logical analysis and a priori thought are not necessarily mutually exclusive. But the process 
must be rigorous; this is why the famous Egyptian man of letters, Dr. Louis 'Awad, has 
characterized post-1952 Egyptian social theory, political thought, economic analysis and moral 
philosophy as shabby. See his essay, 'Cultural and Intellectual Developments in Egypt Since 
1952', in Egypt Since the Revolution, P. J. Vatikiotis, ed. (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 156. 
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cedure skips the crucial step of demonstrating how the removal of the twin 
sources of exploitation over the masses (internal overlords) and the up- 
ward bound, socially mobile middle sectors (external imperialists) will 
solve the tension between precisely these two social groups.13 It is, after 
all, possible to attain unity of consciousness of ethnic identity and culture 
without attaining unity of interests among the diverse corporate groups 
embraced by that culture. 
It will be seen later, below, that despite keen interest among Egyptian 
intellectuals in problems of political theory and philosophy, one will need 
to look long and hard to find a systematic and coherent ideological 
statement of the regime's principles and objectives. Despite the significance 
of democratic cooperative socialism to the regime, it is odd that the current 
body of scholarship produced by the country's intellectuals is couched in 
very general and dogmatic terms. Thus, even the Egyptian socialists 
themselves may be confused about the meaning of democratic cooperative 
socialism14 the construction of which is taking place under the aegis of the 
'popular alliance of the working forces'. 
The foregoing analysis of Egyptian interpretations of socialism accords 
with earlier studies reflecting the lack of concern with analytical rigor in 
fashioning an ideology.15 According to one scholar, 'formal ideology' is 
'relatively unimportant'.16 This is not to say that concern is lacking to 
explain politics in terms of legitimizing ideas. But these ideas have been 
turned toward the negative task of dispelling positions and concepts 
judged to be hopelessly obsolete, antediluvian and counterproductive 
to development. Beyond this the Egyptian military regime is unwilling to 
go, and it has even been hostile to intellectuals and to innovative ideologi- 
13 Consider the following: 'The first step in Arab socialism is justice and sufficiency, plus 
the possibility of measures of revolutionary interaction in a peaceful atmosphere, unsullied 
by the violence of blood and not made insomniac by the spectors of executions! The first step 
in communism is punishment and revenge, because the bloodiness of the struggle among 
classes, in communism's view, is an inescapable necessity'. Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, 
'Nahnu wa al-Shuiu'iyyah' [We and Communism], al-Ahram, August 4, 1961. What one 
wants to know is why and how socialism for the Arabs consists from the very start ofjustice 
and sufficiency. 
14 The term has been borrowed, without acknowledgment, apparently, from a widely 
circulated lecture given by the Iraqi professor of history, Dr. 'Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz, to 
the Arab Renaissance Club in Baghdad in January 1952. Bazzaz contended that the Arab 
nationalist movement of the 1930s and 1940s already contained its 'democratic', 'socialist', 
'popular' and 'cooperative' elements. For English translation of this lecture, see 'Islam and 
Arab Nationalism' [Al-Islam wa al-Qawmiyyah al-'Arabiyyah], in Die Welt des Islams, n.s. 
III (1954), pp. 201-18, esp. p. 214. The first official use of the term, democratic cooperative 
socialism, came on November 1, 1957, in the decree of the President of the Republic establish- 
ing the National Union. 15 Leonard Binder, 'Nasserism: The Protest Movement in the Middle East', in The Revolu- 
tion in World Politics, Morton A. Kaplan, ed. (New York: John Wiley, 1962); Malcolm 
Kerr, 'Arab Radical Notions of Democracy', St. Antony's Papers, No. 16 (Middle Eastern 
Studies, No. 3; London: Chatto and Windus, 1963), pp. 9-40. 
16 Binder, 'Egypt: The Integrative Revolution' in Political Culture and Political Develop- 
ment, Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, eds. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 
p. 445. 
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cal initiatives in general.17 More appropriate in understanding its role and 
function in Egyptian society is the candidly pragmatic approach of the 
regime to it as a mechanism of rule.18 
II. MAN AND THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM 
If egalitarianism does follow from Arab unity and nationalism, so, too, 
do Egyptian socialists insist that freedom emanates from that unity. The 
Arab socialist position is that freedom varies in its meaning from one 
social system to another. Today, Egyptian socialist theoreticians are 
prone to attack freedom in the West and in Soviet-type systems in terms 
of social and political deficiencies respectively. Liberal democracy is 
defective from the perspective of social justice; Marxist and Soviet 
democracy, by contrast, have violated man's individual liberty. Arab 
socialism, according to this line of thinking, nicely meshes the strong 
points of each of these.19 The philosopher, 'Ismat Sayf al-Dawlah, for 
example, approvingly cites the Soviet handbook, Fundamentals of Marxism- 
Leninism. Its editors and contributors, he notes, conclude that while 
philosophers have debated the question of freedom ad infinitum, they have 
always reached erroneous conclusions. But the Egyptian himself then 
adds that what is true of philosophers is not so for the common man. The 
common man states: 'I am free and do what I wish'.20 
One cannot help but feel that the Egyptian is arguing that this is the 
reaction of the Arab Muslim common man. And yet, this individual has 
rarely thought in such patterns. He is free in the sense that he meets his 
God on the basis of equality with respect to other Muslim men. But as is 
17 Is this the typical attitude of the military in general ? Napoleon's contemptuous sobriquet 
of 'ideologue' that he attributed to the French intellectuals of his time comes to mind. He 
meant to distinguish men of action from others. Thus, the term 'ideology' was coined with 
the stigma that a military leader attached to it as the idle activity of do-nothing civilians. On 
the genesis of the term, see George Lichtheim, The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1967), esp. pp. 4-5. 
18 This is clearly implied in the following passage in President 'Abd al-Nasir's address to 
the opening session of the Preparatory Committee of the National Congress of Popular Forces, 
Nov. 25, 1961: 'Many people say we have no theory, we would like you to give us a theory. 
What is the theory we are following? We answer, a socialist democratic cooperative society. 
But they persist in asking for a clearly defined theory. I ask them, what is the object of a theory ? 
I say that I was not asked on July 23rd to stage the revolution with a printed book including 
my theory. This is impossible. If we had stopped to write such a book before July 23rd, we 
would never have succeeded in carrying out two operations at the same time. Those who 
ask for a theory are greatly complicating matters. This is torture'. Cited in Gamal Abdel 
Nasser, President Gamal Abdel Nasser's Speeches and Press Interviews, Jan.-Dec. 1961 
(Cairo: Information Department, 1961), p. 389. Emphasis supplied. 
19 For a major exposition, see Mustafa Abu Zayd Fahmi, Fi al-Hurriyah wa al-Wahdah 
wa al-Ishtirakiyyah [On Freedom, Unity and Socialism] (Alexandria: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1968), 
pp. 17-264. 
20 'Ismat Sayf al-Dawlah, Usus al-Ishtirakiyyah al-'Arabiyyah [Foundations of Arab Social- 
ism] (Cairo: al-Dar al-Qawmiyyah li al-Taba'ah wa al-Nashr, 1965), p. 133. The title of this 
work suggests that it was meant to be the Egyptian Arab socialist response to the Soviet guide, 
Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism (first edition 1959). Reinforcing this impression is the 
author's constant reference to the Soviet work. 
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well known, the socialization patterns in Islamic civilization stress the 
subordination of one's own will to that of higher authorities: God, the 
Prophet, religious leaders, one's elders. It would be a wonder if Muslim 
man's visceral reaction were to be as Sayf al-Dawlah suggests; or at least, 
it would be odd to think of him making this statement as a secular credo. 
The point is that politics and religion are so intermingled in his mind that 
freedom for him means freedom within the fold to be a good member of 
the community. It would thus be freedom to continue as part of, rather 
than freedom to break away from, the community. In the last analysis, 
this distinguishes freedom as a dynamic factor from freedom as a passive, 
inert one. 
Nevertheless, Arab socialist analysts in Egypt broadly imply that it is 
the Western approach to freedom (as a dynamic factor) that equips the 
new Arab man's consciousness. Man is at the core of Egypt's socialism 
(al-'unsur al-awwal) and 'has the right to a free, noble, blessed life ...'21 
Passages such as these reveal the Western education of their authors, 
whose experience with liberalism, Marxism and existentialism has led them 
to interpret their society in terms of the categories of thought central to 
those philosophies. This is natural, of course, and there is certainly nothing 
wrong with it. The problem that Egypt's Arab socialism has encountered 
is the great disparity between the habits of the masses and the exercise of 
freedom in the deep sense intended by Western democratic theory, whether 
liberal, Marxist, or social democratic. 
What emerges from all this is that freedom in Egypt's socialism carries 
the theoretical claim that man takes a stand on an issue as an individual. 
This becomes clear after reading what may be called the 'mainstream' of 
Egyptian socialist literature. Munif al-Razzaz states in irrevocable terms 
that 'every political system must have as its objective the individual'; that 
'the objective of society is to realize the potentialities of the individual'; and 
that 'the freedoms are the foundation of political rights'.22 
Putting it somewhat differently, Professor 'Atif Ahmad of the University 
of Cairo, has explained the relationship of the individual to the State in 
Marxian terms. He stresses that separating society and individual and 
21 Mustafa al-Mistikawi, Fi I'dad al-Insan al-Ishtiraki al-'Arabi [On Rearing the New Arab 
Socialist Man] (Cairo: al-Dar al-Qawmiyyah li al-Taba'ah wa al-Nashr, 1965), pp. 14-5. 
The emphasis of Egypt's Arab socialism is on serving free man, a theme reiterated time and 
again. For full treatments, see Sayyid 'Abd al-Hamid Mursi, Insaniyyah al-Ishtirakiyyah al- 
'Arabiyyah [The Humanism of Arab Socialism] (Cairo: Maktabah al-Qahirah al-Hadithah, 
1966); 'Abd al-Qadir Hatim, Ishtirakiyatuna Insaniyyah Akhlaqiyyah [Our Socialism is 
Humanist and Ethical] (Cairo: al-Dar al-Qawmiyyah li al-Taba'ah wa al-Nashr, 1964); 
Majid Fakhr, Al-Kamal al-Insani Manba' al-Mithaq wa Ghayatuhu [Human Perfection is The 
Source and Objective of the Charter] (Cairo: al-Dar al-Qawmiyyah li al-Taba'ah wa al-Nashr, 
1965); 'Abd al-Rahman Abu al-Khayr, Al-Ba'ith al-Insani li al-Ittijah al-Ishtiraki al-Ta'awuni 
al-Dimuqrati [The Human Causal Factor for the Orientation of Democratic Cooperative 
Socialism] (Cairo: Kutub Qawmiyyah, 1961). 22 Munif al-Razzaz, Ma'alim al-Hayat al-'Arabiyyah al-Jadidah [Benchmarks of the New 
Arab Life] 4th ed. (Beirut: Dar al-'Ilm li al-Milayiin, 1960), pp. 164 ff., 40 ff., 59 ff. 
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posing the question on which is the more important has led us down the 
wrong path. Man has always chosen to live within a social system. In 
fact, it is the social organization and division of production that crystallize 
his life. 'Life is fashioned according to the laws of production that govern 
it'. For Ahmad, therefore, it is not the individual and the development of 
his potentialities to the maximum that is crucial. Rather, he stresses the 
need to guarantee the life and future of men and to meet their physical 
and cultural needs. But Ahmad, like al-Razzaz, would agree that the 
power of the State must be curbed in order to make this possible.23 Here, 
too, the rationalist tradition underlying Western political theory and 
sociology since the Enlightenment period infuses Egyptians with the in- 
spiration to defend humanism. 
Taking another perspective, but equally within the mainstream of 
Egypt's Arab socialism, Mustafa al-Siba'i looks at the question of freedom 
from the viewpoint of poverty understood very broadly. He regards man 
as the repository of certain natural rights, and the withholding of these 
rights impoverishes him. Integral to man's rights is that of freedom- 
human, religious, academic, political, civic, social and moral. Since 
al-Siba'i represents a central tendency in Egypt's socialism as certified by 
Egypt's top leadership,24 what he has to say is a good indication of the 
content of democratic cooperative socialism. Al-Siba'i, like al-Razzaz and 
many others who have influenced Egypt's Arab socialism, treats freedom 
in an ennumerative and descriptive manner.25 He takes his cue from social 
democratic theory in assuming man's essential goodness rather than his 
evil nature (unlike monarchism and fascism, for example). Freedom is 
here seen to be a gift from his Creator to which man happily reaches out 
because it is in his nature to want to be free, productive, creative. 
There is, thus, in Egypt's socialist thought, no doctrine of freedom as 
such. Freedom as a condition of struggle with, and release from, necessity 
seems to be a perspective alien to this thought. This is the case for even 
the pro-Egyptian Ba'thi theoretician, 'Abdallah al-Rimawi, for whom 
"'Man as he really lives in society" is the origin, axis, and causal force of 
his historical development'.26 In short, al-Rimawi starts toward a con- 
ceptual, rather than descriptive and ennumerative, perspective on freedom 
23 Atif Ahmad, 'The Individual and Society,' in Political and Social Thought in the Contem- 
porary Middle East, Kamal Karpat, ed. (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 226. 
24 'We are assured from authoritative sources that [al-Siba'i's book] is considered to be of 
the utmost importance in providing form, direction and legitimacy to the social system emerg- 
ing in present-day Egypt. It is considered to be, in brief, a major statement of ideology for 
Egyptian socialism'. See George H. Gardner and Sami A. Hanna, 'Islamic Socialism', The 
Muslim World, LVI, 2 (April 1966), p. 73. 
25 Mustafa al-Siba'i, Ishtirakiyyah al-Islam [The Socialism of Islam] (Cairo: al-Dar al- 
Qawmiyyah li al-Taba'ah wa al-Nashr, 1960), pp. 35 ff. While he is a Syrian, Egypt claims 
his thought for Egypt's socialism. 
26 Rimawi, Al-Qawmiyyah wa al-Wahdah fi al-Harakat al-Qawmiyyah al-'Arabiyyah al- 
Hadithah [Nationalism and Unity in the Modern Arab Nationalist Movements] (Cairo: Dar 
al-Ma'arif, 1961), p. 463, cited in Karpat, p. 151. 
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(by asserting that man's biological needs, curiosity, will and freedom, and 
desire for equality collectively are responsible for historical movement 
and development); but he stops short of a deeper analysis and in fact 
repudiates idealism, metaphysics, entropy, infinity and dialectical material- 
ism 'in so far as they constitute a method of inquiry into man, his society, 
culture and history'.27 Unfortunately al-Rimawi is reduced to making 
ex-cathedra statements that man is free by nature; and we are once again 
struck by the proclivity for avoiding abstract theoretical explication in 
the eagerness to postulate certain givens. 
Among Egyptian socialists, it is 'Ismat Sayf al-Dawlah who carries the 
debate to higher and more sophisticated levels. While for the most part 
the routine analyses of socialism rest content with categoric affirmations 
concerning the realization of freedom under Arab unity and the Arab 
nation, Sayf al-Dawlah closely investigates the relationship between free- 
dom and necessity. In keeping with his dialectical method, he concludes 
that without the doctrine of necessity, there could be no such thing as 
freedom. 'Necessity', he writes, 'is the primary condition that makes 
any act in the future possible'. Or later: the occurrence of things that we 
decide to do depends on the scientific inevitability of the various laws of 
the universe. Freedom, therefore, is a 'movement the end of which is the 
future that has not yet occurred but which is heading toward occurrence 
in the chosen way'. Sayf al-Dawlah rejects the idea that freedom is a 
phenomenon of spontaneous passage of past into future.28 
Plainly put, Sayf al-Dawlah is asserting that any world view which in- 
sists that history is a sequence of chance events of nature and human 
behavior taking place haphazardly cannot possibly have anything to do 
with human freedom. If anything, freedom is an actively and wilfully 
affirmed force. Consequently, the author attacks deterministic philoso- 
phies and refutes Bergsonian vitalism. The notion of entelechy (some life 
force immanent in the universe) is one that destroys the possibility of 
freedom. On the other extreme is existentialism, which treats freedom as a 
function of purely individual choice; this seems to be an outgrowth of the 
Kantian perspective that freedom ultimately is the exercise of one's 
judgment in acting based on one's perception of what is morally appro- 
priate for the self to do.29 This, too, is unsound for Sayf al-Dawlah, 
whose solution of the problem of freedom might be said to rest between 
vitalism and Kantian inspired existentialism. The irony that Soviet 
Marxism also attempts to tread a middle ground between deterministic 
and idealist outlooks on freedom leads one to try to capture the difference 
27 Idem. 
28 Sayf al-Dawlah, Usus al-Ishtirakiyyah, pp. 133-4. 
29 For Kant 'freedom meant "autonomy". It is the expression of the principle that the moral 
subject has to obey no rules other than those which he gives to himself'. Ernst Cassirer, The 
Myth of the State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946), p. 235. 
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between the Soviets and Egyptians concerning this aspect of their ideolo- 
gies. 
This is not easily done, however, since both handbooks, The Funda- 
mentals of Marxism-Leninism and The Foundations of Arab Socialism are 
extremely cautious. The Soviet's position is that 'Taking necessity as the 
basis, dialectical materialism simultaneously recognizes the possibility 
of the freedom of man. The real freedom of man consists not in an imagin- 
ary dependence of man upon natural and social laws... but in under- 
standing these laws and acting according to them'.30 
Yet, this seems very much akin to the Egyptian version (published later 
in time). For, despite his stated objections, Sayf al-Dawlah's position is 
that genuine freedom means 'the regulation of the world's movement by 
that which is within man, based on determinative laws which are or can 
be known'.31 
But, Sayf al-Dawlah notes, the Soviets will only go so far and no further. 
Thus, they adhere to the thesis that man is capable of understanding the 
laws of nature and social development; and by their knowledge of these 
laws, they necessarily take their place in the movement of history. Yet, 
this is tantamount to dismissing man altogether. For the logical con- 
clusion of the Soviet position is that man can only understand, not change, 
historical development. 
The quarrel that the Egyptian has picked with the Soviets thus boils 
down to the ability or inability of man to change the course of history. The 
maximum the Soviets are willing to concede is that man uses his knowledge 
of the laws of nature and society to make them serve him. But this does not 
constitute an admission that man can alter the course of things The 
emphasis appears to be on man being able to make his life more efficient, 
more secure, more enjoyable. The Egyptian, by contrast, wants to go 
further and acknowledge that man does have the power to alter the broad 
sweep of historical development that encompasses him. 
The Egyptian agrees with the fundamental principle that all movement is 
dialectical in nature. Hence, his quarrel with Marxism-Leninism is not 
that it is based on the dialectical principle. Rather, he repudiates the mater- 
ialist parameters that allegedly restrict man's influence to one of passive 
comprehension of the world about him In place of materialism he erects 
the dialectics of man, a more dynamic paradigm which claims 'the law of 
dialectics is a law peculiar to man, alone'. Man's development in history 
takes place according to characteristic laws that are specific to him 
(al-qawanin al-naw'iyyah al-khassah bi al-insan) And these laws all 
30 0. V. Kuusinen, et al., eds., Osnovy Marksizma-Leninizma, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Gosudar- 
stvennoe Izdatelstovo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1962), pp. 113-14. Among the determinists 
are listed Islam and Holbachs (the French materialist philosopher); among the idealists, of 
course, Hegel. 
31 Sayf al-Dawlah, Usus al-Ishtirakiyyah al-'Arabiyyah, p. 149. 
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concern freedom: to exist, to choose, to know, to do, to reason, and so on: 
Freedom rightly understood consists of knowing how man guides the movement of 
evolution by his subjecting both matter and thought to his will. When the common 
man says: 'I am free to do what I want,' it is he alone who is free to want and do. It 
is this that is his characteristic law, the likes of which cannot be found in a material 
nature that does not want or an absolute idea that cannot do.32 
Thus, neither matter nor Absolute Idea are in and of themselves a primal 
generating force of existence. To Sayf al-Dawlah the dialectics operate 
in the following manner: problems emerge in society (thesis); man ad- 
dresses himself to these problems and formulates a theoretical resolution 
for each (antithesis); man resolves the conflict by putting into practice 
the mental resolution he had already devised in the preceding stage 
(synthesis). Again, Sayf al-Dawlah on freedom: 
Freedom is the ability to develop, it is the understanding and resolution of a problem, 
and the implementation of the solution by action. Thus, we have arrived at that standard 
that we are examining in order to know what accords with freedom and what is con- 
sidered tyranny. For making freedom consists of the motion of dialectics, with the 
knowledge we have that man is the only disputant, enables us to be superior to all these 
materialist or idealist theories which deprive man of his dialectical capacity and subject 
him to fatalism regarding nature, history, spirit or thought; in short, which subject man 
to an external force.33 
III. FREEDOM IN MARX, MARXISM-LENINISM AND EGYPT'S 
SOCIALISM: SOME CLARIFICATIONS 
With this survey of the shortcomings of Hegelianism and Marxism- 
Leninism, Sayf al-Dawlah boldly asserts that it remains for the Arab 
world to establish a genuine concept of freedom to contrast with the fail- 
ures of the bourgeois and communist models. In this, the thirteen centuries 
of Islam 'in which we have always glorified the freedom of man',34 give 
Arab civilization a tremendous advantage. 
32 Ibid., pp. 149-50. 
33 Ibid., pp. 158-9. 
34 Ibid., p. 171. Here, Sayfal-Dawlah slips into apologia. Does he have in mind the Qur'an's 
prescriptions and the traditions and sayings of the Prophet, Muhammad? Or does he mean 
rather the precedents set by the first four Caliphs and the four great jurisprudents of Islamic 
law, Hanbal, Hanafi, Shafi'i and Maliki? Or does he really mean the 1,300 years of political 
and social experience of Muslim civilization ? From the language, he seems to mean basically 
the last. It seems he feels that freedom has been glorified all along the line of Islam's existence. 
But can we really take him seriously? Thirteen hundred years is a long time, and many tyran- 
nies intervened along the way. Since freedom has already been defined by him in terms of 
man's ability to develop based on unhindered and unrestricted existence, choice, opinion, 
argumentation, action, has Muslim man according to these criteria, really been free? To take 
one aspect of Islamic theory, how can Sayf al-Dawlah take this position in view of the 'closing 
of the gates of ijtihad' (independent judgment) at the end of the third century A.H. And what 
about the decision long ago adopted in favor of orthodoxy and against the mu'tazilah on the 
issue of predetermination and free will? 'The self-responsible architect of one's own life' idea 
that best describes freedom as an ethical component is completely alien to thirteen centuries 
of Islamic civilization. [The term is that of Herbert Marcuse, Soviet Marxism (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1961), p. 181.] If Sayf al-Dawlah means, by contrast, that Islam has glorified 
the freedom of man in a 'civil liberty' sense (Marcuse), an examination of the legal and social 
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Apart from his claim for Islam, Sayf al-Dawlah (and many other writers, 
too) runs into serious trouble by confusing Marx with Soviet Marxism. 
(Here, Marx's plaintive assertion that 'I am not a Marxist' comes into 
mind.) What Sayf al-Dawlah presents as the 'dialectics of man' is perhaps 
not all that original, after all. Consider the following: 'For Marx, as for 
Hegel, freedom meant self-determination in accordance with one's inner 
constitution; it meant not being determined from without, by one's re- 
lations to other things, but by the logical principles of one's own develop- 
ment'.35 It was Marx, was it not, who said that the dialectics take place 
through man's actions. 'Marx's view does not reduce man to a passive 
acceptance of, and acquiescence in, unchangeable and unchallengeable 
circumstances'.36 Marx took an activist view of man, who could truly 
change his life's chances and circumstances in concert with his fellow men. 
Nothing could be further from the truth than that Marx's view of freedom 
was that it came as a mere epiphenomenon to the interplay of material 
forces whose mechanistic movement heads toward ultimate liberation: 
Marx [identified] thought with human self-consciousness, and the motive power of 
history with a specifically human spirit of essence ... Marx in consequence rejects the 
non-human Absolute Idea as something alien to humanity and to man and regards its 
alleged social manifestation (e.g. Hegel's rational State and its organs) as attempts to 
erect authoritarian social institutions 'dominated by a spirit not their own'.37 
In other words, neither machines nor impersonal ideational forces free 
men in Marx's thought, yet this is the kind of picture that Egyptian 
theoreticians of Arab socialism appear to be presenting to their readers 
about Marxian socialism. To cite another leading authority on the subject: 
[To Marx] history is not the succession of the effects on men of external environment or 
of their own unalterable constitutions, or even the interplay between these factors, as 
earlier materialists had supposed. Its essence is the struggle of men to realize their full 
human potentialities; and since they are members of the natural kingdom (for there is 
nothing that transcends it), man's effort to realize himself fully is a striving to escape 
from being the plaything of forces that seem at once mysterious, arbitrary and irresistible, 
that is, to attain to the mastery of them and of himself which is freedom. Man attains 
this subjugation of his world not by increase in knowledge obtained by contemplation 
(as Aristotle had supposed)-but by activity-by labor-the conscious molding by men 
of their environment and of each other-the first and most essential form of the unity of 
will and thought and deed, of theory and practice.38 
systems of Muslim theorists will show that this is at least moot. Obviously, Islam does not 
advocate slavery and does champion the right of man to be his own spokesman in his relation.. 
ship to God. But it is not here a question of such matters. Islam never experienced a separate 
freedom function as civil liberty ('being able to do what is not prohibited by law'-Marcuse) 
since there was never any truly autonomous political system in Islam. 35 Eugene Kamenka, The Ethical Foundations of Marxism (New York: Praeger, 1962), 
p. 23. 
36 Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1968), p. 92. 37 Kamenka, Ethical Foundations, p. 24. 
38 Sir Isaiah Berlin, Karl Marx: His Life and Encironment, 3rd edition (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1963), p. 128, emphases supplied. 
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Hence, while the distinction concerning freedom between the Soviet 
variation on Marx and that of Sayf al-Dawlah's Egyptian Arab socialism 
seems at least implicitly clear, it is difficult to find such a distinction 
between the Egyptian version and that of Marx himself. Nevertheless, the 
distinction exists, and it lies, as shall be seen below, in the role and function 
of religion. Egyptian theorists are obsessed with refuting the Soviet 
perversion of Marx and remain virtually insensitive to the humanistic 
foundations of Marxian ethics. Where, in the Egyptian exegesis of Marx- 
ism, is the concept of the alienation of man from his own labor, with its 
attendant point of departure in the human condition ?39 Why the incessant 
harping on the threat of the 'machine'? Perhaps this is the normal reaction 
of adherents of a body of thought that is still in the gestation stage and 
that is still shaky in its foundations. In any case, closer to the truth is the 
judgment that 'Karl Marx... came to Communism in the interests of 
freedom, not of security'.40 In a word, the strange and unreal picture 
painted by Egyptian theoreticians of robot-like machines forming the 
foundations of a socialist society and thrusting man aside appears to be 
a polemical device by which these regime spokesmen attack and isolate the 
radical left internal opposition.41 In doing this they corner the market, 
as it were, on the humanistic bases of socialism and assert a continuity 
with Islamic ethics. Forging such links of continuity with the ethical 
foundations of the traditional Islamic culture is an appropriate task for 
the Egyptian theorists. But this does not mean that Marx may be excluded 
from those who, as socialists, aspire to a society rooted in freedom. 
IV. ISLAMIC ETHICS AND DEMOCRATIC COOPERATIVE SOCIALISM 
The most articulate spokesman of the relationship between Islam and 
socialism in the Arab world is the Syrian, Mustafa al-Siba'i. His work, 
The Socialism of Islam, has already been mentioned above. Socialism 
having emerged as a doctrine of social and economic organization, one 
normally does not conceive of it in relationship to transcendental thought. 
Yet, Egyptian socialists strongly urge the view that not only are the two 
compatible, but that Islam is the socialist religion par excellence. 
This is interesting in view of the early bias in Islam against the univer- 
sality of reason and the religion's integral concepts of the oneness of 
God and the uncreated Qur'an. The anti-rational posture, enshrined in 
39 'To be radical is to grasp things by the root. But for man the root is man himself', Marx, 
Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, cited by Roger Garaudy, Marxism 
in the Twentieth Century (Tr. Rene Hague; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966), p. 76. 
Marx begins and ends with man in his thinking about the establishment of socialist society. 
It is misleading and wrong, therefore, to claim that Arab socialism stands out in contrast to 
Marxism in the sense of humaneness and humanism. 
40 Kamenka, Ethical Foundations, p. vii. 
41 Not that the radical Left does not unhesitatingly cleave to the Soviet Marxist version. 
In fact, very few intellectuals in Egypt have sought to distinguish themselves as Marxists, 
rather than Marxist-Leninists. 
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the victory over the mu'tazilah in the ninth century, would appear on the 
surface to be inconsistent with a body of thought and action-socialism- 
whose structure has been built on libertarian foundations.42 The argument 
revolves around the perception of Islamic thought: is it rooted in magic, 
fatalism, nonchalant occasionalism? Or does it, in fact, adhere root and 
branch to a rationalist framework? According to Rodinson, the well- 
known French sociologist of Islam, the Islam of the Qur'an 'causes the 
intervention of reason and rationality to a higher degree than the ideologies 
reflected by the Old and New Testaments'.43 But even Rodinson, whose 
objective is to show that there is nothing inherent in Islam that forbids 
capitalist development, does not go so far as to say that in medieval 
Islam (cf. the Islam of the Qur'an), reason and rationality were brought 
to bear at a high level of intellectual experience. Indeed, he admits the 
supremacy of fatalism in Islamic thought (although he does deny 
that proof exists to show that this thought is fatalistic because it is 
Islamic). 
To Egyptian theorists, the concept of socialism signifies 'a human 
tendency which finds clear expression in the teaching of the prophets and 
in the work of reformers from earliest times'. If Islam is directed against 
man's use of property in order to exploit his fellow men and to achieve 
social equality and justice through the instrument of state regulation, then 
Islam indeed has been from the very beginning a socialist system.44 But 
has this been the case ? 
Egypt's Arab socialists feel that for man an orientation toward collec- 
tivity is a normal state of being. The cultural heritage of Islam has already 
placed Muslim man squarely in the midst of the ummah, or community 
of true believers. Egyptians have therefore always shared a communal 
experience, apart from which an individual's life would be meaningless.45 
Islam, however, also sanctions ownership of private property. Moreover, 
there is really nothing in the Islamic Weltanschauung that seriously 
hinders the development and growth of a capitalist system.46 After all, 
Islam derived from a mercantile tribal organization in which commerce 
constituted the crucial means of exchange. The Qur'an and Islamic 
jurisprudence based onI it recognize the right to own and inherit property, 
42 But cf. St. Simon and his 'New Christianity'. 'The association of socialism with demo- 
cracy took time to establish itself; that of socialism with republicanism (let alone atheism) 
was far from obvious, at any rate to radicals outside France.... By [the 1890s], however, 
socialism as a doctrine was already fully formed, and the attitudes it encouraged, although 
tinged with religious sentiment, were subversive of the social teachings which the churches 
had traditionally made their own'. George Lichtheim, The Origins of Socialism (New York: 
Praeger, 1969), p. 8. 
43 Maxime Rodinson, Islam et capitalisme (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1966), p. 112. 
44 Siba'i, Ishtirakiyyah al-Islam, pp. 5 ff. 
45 Gustave von Grunebaum, Modern Islam: The Search for Cultulral Identity (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1964), p. 246. 
46 Rodinson, Islam et capitalisme, passim. 
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wealth, possessions. Some of the most detailed parts of the Qur'an itself 
are devoted to legal rights of inheritance, for example. In theory, of course, 
everything in a Muslim's possession is ultimately the property of Allah. 
The implication is thus that God is the 'owner' of all possessions in the 
Islamic ummah. However, even the successors to the Prophet of God 
did not have the right in law to dispossess or expropriate errant citizens 
of the ummah, except for apostasy.47 Also, Islam has a vigorous concern 
with the terrestrial life and urges man to live a full life in the here and 
now. 
Consequently, one notes a dualism in Islam with respect to man's 
place in the world. The two, individualism and collectivism, work at 
cross-purposes with one another and serve to complicate the current 
attempts to find a place for Islam in the modern Muslim community. 
For example, to Kamal al-Din Mahmud Rif'at, a major regime theoretician 
of socialism, Islam represents a social system more than a religious creed. 
He approvingly notes that its role in leading toward spiritual perfection 
well accords with the aims of socialism: equality, individual dignity and 
ethical relations among men. Rif'at notes that in the UAR, 'free man is 
the basis of a free society'. Freedom of the individual human being is the 
'greatest incentive of the [revolutionary] struggle and the primary guarantee 
against negativism, indifference and hopelessness'. However, since man 
tends to be egotistical in his behavior, the role of religion is 'to subject 
the mind of the individual to the common interest, to regulate its behavior 
so that it accords with, not contradicts, the life of society'.48 Religion and 
socialism, far from being incompatible, are well suited to the Egyptian 
reality in Rif'at's mind. The one thing to fear is attempts by reactionaries 
(the Muslim Brotherhood, the bourgeoisie), to employ religion to retard 
social progress. 
Egypt's Charter of National Action (1962) ensures an important place 
for religious and spiritual values in the socialist society that Egypt is 
seeking to build. The thrust of the official regime position appears to be 
that Islam represents a system of social justice. Islam shares with other 
religious creeds the concept of fraternity and right conduct among all 
men. It insists that true piety, not merely earthly prosperity, is the path 
toward acceptance by God. Islam, like Christianity, does make invidious 
distinctions between the meek, downtrodden, poor, and the wealthy, 
47 This right of expropriation established itself with the onset of the dynastic principle, 
especially in the Ottoman Empire. There, it became a potent political weapon against the 
Sultan's opponents. 
48 Rif'at, 'Al-Tajribah al-Ishtirakiyyah fi al-Jumhuriyyah al-'Arabiyyah al-Muttahidah', 
[The Socialist Experiment in the UAR], al-Katib, special supplement, No. 75 (June 1967), 
pp. 5, 9. 'Free man is the basis and capable builder of the free society' is an idea directly 
from the National Charter, the official programmatic statement of Egypt's socialism. The 
literature is voluminous on this subject but tends to be didactic. For another view, see Dr. 
Yahya al-Jamal, 'Al-Ishtirakiyyah bayna al-Wahdah wa al-Ta'addud' [Socialism Between 
Unity and Diversity], al-Fikr al-Mu'asir, No. 10 (Dec. 1965), pp. 40-7. 
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prosperous and arrogant. This has led the late President 'Abd al-Nasir to 
remark that 'Islam was the first revolution which posed socialist principles 
in matters of justice and equality'.49 
The ethical Problematik involves man's relationship to other men and 
society. If one approaches this from the perspective of the proper ends of 
mankind, what may one conclude about Egypt's socialism and its con- 
ception of this important question? For the ancient Greeks, man's end 
was a life of reason, whose control over the physical universe served to 
permit his self-realization. In classical Islam man's true end was service to 
God, and only in such submission could one perfect himself. In the modern 
nation-State, where the constitution (since 1971, anyway) declares Islam 
to be the religion of the State, what are the ends of man? The response 
given thus far in Egypt has been surprisingly non-revolutionary in nature. 
It has been shaped by persons whom we might regard as neo-Keyneseans, 
whose political views have been shaped by a strong dosage of anti- 
colonial nationalism. The moderate and humanistic outlook of these 
individual theorists seems close to that of Fabian socialism. Society exists 
to realize the potentialities of the individual, according to this line of 
thinking. Society 'must secure for every man wide scope to allow him to 
realize his potentialities and inclinations in a way for which his abilities 
qualify him, without limitations or restrictions of poverty, inheritance, 
milieu, occupation or oppressive laws'.50 Otherwise put, society must 
allow opportunity for each man to go as far as his qualifications will 
enable him to go, everything else being equal. This is not a redistributive 
theory of society. Indeed, there is nothing radical here about what amounts 
to a social welfare state position. And, crucially, al-Razzaz does not 
advocate structural transformation of society on behalf of any single 
social class or force. 
Religion plays a role as the leaven that allows the society to grow and 
develop itself without facing the dangers of material forces and the general 
tendency toward randomness and entropy that secularization tends to 
foster. This contemporary view represents a change in perspective as far as 
religion is concerned. These present-day socialist theoreticians seem to 
have latent social contract ideas. Accordingly, society comes into being 
not necessarily because it is the natural human community to work the 
will of God on earth. Rather, society arises in order to enable men the 
better to realize their own human possibilities. The socialist theorists are 
therefore stressing the existence of a separate political function and sphere, 
reserving for religion a different and more private realm. Man, therefore, 
49 Speech commemorating the fourth anniversary of the UAR, cited in al-Ahram, February 
23, 1962. This brings to mind Lichtheim's plaint that to be a Christian, a Buddhist (a Muslim) 
and to profess belief in socialism does not make it true that the religions-Christianity, 
Buddhism (Islam)-are inherently socialist. Origins of Socialism, p. 221, n. 5. 50 Al-Razzaz, Ma'alim al-Hayat al-'Arabiyyah al-Jadidah, pp. 48 ff. 
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will resort to Islamic morality and ethics in his inner life only, within the 
bosom of his family. 
Gathering together some of the strands of the foregoing discussion, the 
striking thing about Egypt's socialism is that religion is an important 
factor. The Egyptians regard both Islam and socialism as supremely 
ethical statements of the human condition. If Marx would assert that 
labor is the force that will end man's alienation from others and from 
himself, Egypt's Arab socialism holds that belief in a transcendental 
metaphysic will serve this purpose. (This leaves aside entirely the notion 
entertained by both Marxism and Egypt's socialism that social organi- 
zation will prove indispensible for ending the alienation perceived by each.) 
Altogether, the question of how crucial a role Islam will play in the 
construction of socialism in Egypt depends upon whom one reads. Rif'at, 
as a spokesman for the regime, tends to see it more as a tool to reinforce 
the bonds between individual and group. Thus, one might say that to him, 
socialism is more the ultimate purpose, religion being a helpful means to 
its achievement. Siba'i, by contrast, tends to see a far more autonomous 
role for religion. Islam is the crucial variable, for him, without which 
socialism can become a tyranny.51 Socialism needs Islam. Islam makes 
socialism possible. Rif'at never even raises the question of secularization 
as containing the seeds of potential tyranny. 
We may note that, despite their differential emphases, both wings of 
Egypt's socialism tend to agree that the proper ends of mankind can only 
be achieved if one acknowledges some scope for spiritual forces. In this 
context, Egyptians either refuse to pose the question of the primacy of 
mind or matter as an absured dichotomy (Sayf al-Dawlah); or else they 
invariably declare the precedence of mind. One of the most detailed 
Egyptian rebuttals to the Soviet view that 'material philosophy is the 
reliable weapon that defends man from the pernicious influence of spiritual 
reaction'52 has sought to marshal evidence from the early European 
socialists themselves to support his 'mind over matter' thesis.53 Human 
society requires religion, and spirituality must supervene when the issue 
is joined over mind and matter. The National Charter, in more restrained 
language, nevertheless links the attainment of justice (a proper end for 
mankind) to 'an unshakeable faith in God, His prophets and His sacred 
messages'.54 
51 See his disparaging comments about communism and the U.S.S.R., Ishtirakiyyah al- 
Islam, pp. 10-13. 
52 Kuusinen, et al., Osnovy Marksizma-Leninisma, p. 15. 53 Muhammad Tal'at 'Isa, 'Al-Nuzum al-Diniyah wa al-Ishtirakiyyah: Dirasah li al- 
Muqawwimat al-Ruhiyyah li al-Ishtirakiyyah al-'Arabiyyah muqaranah li al-Ishtirakiyyah 
al-'Alamiyyah' [Religious Systems and Socialism: A Study of the Spiritual Elements of 
Arab Socialism Compared to International Socialism]; al-Majallah al-Misriyyah li al-'Ulum 
al-Siyasiyyah, No. 49 (April 1965), pp. 61-96. 54 United Arab Republic, The Charter (Cairo: Information Department, 1962), p. 8. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
It is somewhat ironical that the Egyptians use that Marxist term, 'scientific 
socialism', to characterize democratic cooperative socialism. The problems 
of cause and effect, necessity and freedom, and man and God are areas of 
disagreement, as well as of agreement, between Egyptian and Marxist 
socialism. Although the differences are striking, one must not lose sight 
of the similarities. 
The main difficulty in differentiating the Egyptian variant of socialism 
from that of Marxism lies, as we have seen, in an inability to distinguish 
Marx's contributions from those of his vulgarizers, Engels, Lenin and 
Stalin. The Polish philosopher, Henryk Skolimovski,55 has usefully 
separated out Marxism from the Marxism of Engels and Lenin and from 
'Machiavellian Marxism'. If Marxism may be regarded as philosophy, 
Marxism-Engelsism-Leninism as ideology, and Machiavellian Marxism 
finally as the 'opportunism of the Party', we can better appreciate that 
what goes under the name of Marxist thought is not so monolithic as the 
Egyptian theorists consider it to be. 
We know that Marx regarded social conflict and contradiction as the 
causal agents of change. The Egyptians do not agree and insist that de- 
velopment occurs according to a dynamic of fusion, not fission. This 
means two important things: (1) unity must be achieved by a process of 
reconciliation and harmonization-it is the precondition for successful 
socialist construction; (2) the motor of man's historical development is 
the nation-state idea, founded on a common basis of ethnicity and re- 
ligious belief (Rodinson's 'dynamique globale'). 
As far as the metaphysical question of freedom versus necessity is 
concerned, Marxist theory is not entirely different from Egypt's Arab 
socialism. The emphasis both place on man as the creator of his history 
is notable.56 But, in point of fact, the Egyptians ignore this aspect of 
Marxism completely. Thus, to Marx, man is the substance of existence, the 
world around him is the form. Yet, this position tends to be eclipsed in 
the mind of most persons, who refer to the universal social laws for which 
Marxist theory is so famous as evidence of the determinism of Marxism. 
Egypt's Arab socialism attaches importance to the dignity of man. It 
denies that man is determined in his behavior. However, its leading philo- 
sopher, 'Ismat Sayf al-Dawlah, does admit that necessity operates in the 
physical universe and that natural laws occur irrespective of man's exist- 
ence and/or involvement. Yet, due to certain 'special laws characteristic of 
55 Skolimovski, 'Polish Marxism', paper delivered at the University Seminar on Com- 
munism, Men's Faculty Club, Columbia University, New York, New York, December 17, 
1969. 
56 
'History does nothing... rather, it is man, actual and living man, who does all this'. 
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Holy Family, cited in Adam Schaff, Marxism and the 
Human Individual (New York: McGraw Hill, 1970), p. 139. 
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man' the human being can overcome natural forces. Sayf al-Dawlah 
accuses Marxism of imposing a rigid framework on man, who must cope 
with his situation as best he can. Yet, Marx himself wrote: 'man is no 
abstract being, squatting outside the world'.57 And Marx showed his 
indignation with the view of man as the plaything of forces and in 'fan- 
tastic isolation' from reality.58 Marx deplored the idea that man should 
only try to comprehend his universe, criticizing all philosophers because 
they 'have only interpreted the world, in various ways', and noting, 
instead, that 'the point, however, is to change it'.59 
Of course, Egypt's Arab socialism breaks sharply with Marxism on the 
question of transcendentalism. It is possible, evidently, for Christians, 
for example, to be Marxists; and at least one scholar of international 
repute has called himself a 'transcendental Marxist'.60 Marx's views on 
religion are too well known to be introduced here. The Egyptian socialist 
interpretation of Marxism is that because of its rejection of organized 
religion, it rejects morality and ethics as a whole.61 
Even on the question of religion, however, it is useful to distinguish 
within Egyptian socialism between those who regard Islam as indispensable 
for socialism and those who consider it in more instrumental terms. In the 
latter case, Islam becomes an aid to secularization, although this is never 
admitted. Marx's point about religion was that, at worst, it caused man to 
lose himself; and, at best, it prevented him from finding himself. And the 
reason for this, according to Marx, is that organized religion proceeds on 
the premise that it makes man-that is, it makes him whole. In reacting 
to this assumption, Marxism holds that it is man who makes religion, 
and he has the power to unmake (i.e. to unmask) it. The Egyptian theore- 
ticians sidestep this issue and reinforce Islam's basically ethical positions. 
Accordingly, they deny that religion at its most noble and perfect state 
exploits man and causes his alienation. To the contrary, man can only 
find himself by communing with God. 
How socialist is Egyptian socialism ? This is a question that has been on 
the tongue of many people, both within Egypt and outside the country. 
57 Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Joseph O'Malley, ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 131. 58 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, R. Pascal, ed. (New York: 
International Publishers, 1947), p. 15. 
59 Karl Marx, 'Theses on Feuerbach', in Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and 
Philosophy, Lewis S. Feuer, ed. (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1959), p. 245. 60 Claude Levi-Strauss, who meant by this phrase that if religious belief depends on social 
structure and processes, nonetheless there is such a dense interplay between the two that 
'it is not simply a matter of one level "determining" the other.. .', Nur Yalman, 'Some 
Observations on Secularism in Islam: The Cultural Revolution in Turkey', Daedalus, CII, 1 
(Winter 1973), p. 143. 
61 Marx's preference for Prometheus over Christ because Prometheus defended man against 
the gods, whereas Christ defended God against man, is worthy of note here. See Lloyd D. 
Easton and Kurt H. Guddat, eds., 'Introduction', Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy 
and Society (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1967), p. 5. 
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In particular, what is its relationship to Marxism, since, in the words of 
one leading authority on Middle East politics, 'the study of ideology has 
received its greatest impetus from Marx .. .62 In the realm of metaphysics 
it has been shown, the two systems share some common premises and even 
conclusions about man. Yet, they remain distinct from one another, and 
this is attributable in the last analysis to the significant gaps in the respec- 
tive historical background and foundations of European and Middle East 
societies. 
62 Leonard Binder, The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East (New York: John Wiley, 
1964), p. 108. 
